| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12367 |
| DP12367 On the Dilution of Market Power | |
| Mathieu Parenti; Philip Ushchev; Jacques-François Thisse; Sergey Kokovin | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-12 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale firms may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under which the free entry and exit of small firms incentivizes big firms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, behaving as if in monopolistic competition. We call this result the dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specific market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Dominant firms Monopolistically competitive fringe Monopolistic competition Contestable markets Oligopoly |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12367 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541178 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mathieu Parenti,Philip Ushchev,Jacques-François Thisse,et al. DP12367 On the Dilution of Market Power. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
