| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12374 |
| DP12374 Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections | |
| Laurent Bouton | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-15 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the behavior of ethical voters in multicandidate elections. We consider two common electoral rules: plurality and majority runoff. Our model delivers crisper predictions than those of the pivotal voter model. An equilibrium always exists, and is unique for a broad range of parameter values. There are two types of equilibria: (i) the sincere voting equilibrium (voters vote for their most-preferred candidate), and (ii) Duverger's Law equilibria (two candidates attract all the votes). These never coexist. We identify the features of an election that favor sincere voting. Consistent with evidence, incentives to vote sincerely are stronger under majority runoff. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Multicandidate elections Ethical voting Group-based voting Plurality rule Majority runoff rule |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12374 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541185 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton. DP12374 Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections. 2017. |
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