| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12392 |
| DP12392 Coordination on Networks | |
| Yves Zenou; Matthew Leister; Junjie Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a coordination game among agents on a network, choosing whether or not to take an action that yields value increasing in the actions of neighbors. In a standard global game setting, players receive noisy information of the technology’s common state-dependent value. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure equilibrium in the noiseless limit. This equilibrium partitions players into coordina- tion sets, within members take a common cutoff strategy and are path connected. We derive an algorithm for calculating limiting cutoffs, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to inhabit the same coordination set. The strategic effects of perturbations to players’ underlining values are shown to spread throughout but be contained within the perturbed players’ coordination sets. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Global games Coordination Network partition Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12392 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yves Zenou,Matthew Leister,Junjie Zhou. DP12392 Coordination on Networks. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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