| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12407
|
| DP12407 A Model of Focusing in Political Choice |
| Salvatore Nunnari; Jan Zapal
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-30
|
| 出版年 | 2017
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model of voters' and politicians' behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on and, hence, overweigh certain attributes of policies. We assume that policies have two attributes---resources devoted to two distinct issues (e.g., defense and education)---and that voters focus more on the attribute in which their options differ more. First, we consider exogenous policies and show that focusing polarizes the electorate. Second, we consider the endogenous supply of policies by politicians running for office and show that focusing leads to inefficiencies: voters that are more focused are more influential; distorted attention empowers social groups that are larger and more sensitive to changes on either issue; resources are channelled towards divisive issues. Finally, we show that augmenting classical models of electoral competition with focusing can contribute to explain puzzling stylized facts such as the inverse correlation between income inequality and redistribution. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12407-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541216
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Salvatore Nunnari,Jan Zapal. DP12407 A Model of Focusing in Political Choice. 2017.
|
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