| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12199 |
| DP12199 Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach | |
| Saul Lach; Zvika Neeman; Mark Schankerman | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-03 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero co-financing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard (two effort levels), the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing, and a second with a lower interest plus co-financing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to the private venture capital market. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, cost of public funds, and effectiveness of the private VC industry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Innovation R&d Start-ups entrepreneurship Additionality Government finance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12199-2 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541231 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Saul Lach,Zvika Neeman,Mark Schankerman. DP12199 Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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