全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP12439 The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP12439
	DP12439 The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off
	Nancy Qian; Monica Martinez-Bravo; Gerard Padró i Miquel
发表日期	2017-11-15
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We propose a simple informational theory to explain why autocratic regimes introduce local elections. Because citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, delegation of authority via local elections improves selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have no incentive to implement unpopular centrally mandated policies. The model makes several predictions: i) elections pose a trade-off between performance and vertical control; ii) elections improve the selection of officials; and iii) an increase in bureaucratic capacity reduces the desirability of elections for the autocrat. To test (i) and (ii), we collect a large village-level panel dataset from rural China. Consistent with the model, we find that elections improve (weaken) the implementation of popular (unpopular) policies, and improve official selection. We provide a large body of qualitative and descriptive evidence to support (iii). In doing so, we shed light on why the Chinese government has systematically undermined village governments twenty years after they were introduced.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Political economy Economic development
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp12439
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541250
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nancy Qian,Monica Martinez-Bravo,Gerard Padró i Miquel. DP12439 The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off. 2017.