| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12450 |
| DP12450 Regulating False Disclosure | |
| Maarten Janssen; Santanu Roy | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-20 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and disclosure where disclosure may be deliberately false. In a competitive setting, we examine the effect of regulation penalizing false disclosure. Stronger regulation reduces the reliance on price signaling, thereby lowering market power and consumption distortions; however, it often creates incentives for excessive disclosure. Regulation is suboptimal unless disclosure itself is inexpensive and even in the latter case, only strong regulation is welfare improving. Weak regulation is always worse than no regulation. Even high quality firms suffer due to regulation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Disclosure Regulation Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12450 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maarten Janssen,Santanu Roy. DP12450 Regulating False Disclosure. 2017. |
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