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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12452 |
DP12452 Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming? | |
Martin Peitz | |
发表日期 | 2017-11-21 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If users on both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on either side exclusive access to its users on the other side. In contrast, if users on one side can multihome, platforms exert monopoly power on that side and compete on the singlehoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true: the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Network effects Two-sided markets Platform competition Competitive bottleneck Multihoming |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12452 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541263 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Peitz. DP12452 Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming?. 2017. |
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