G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12455
DP12455 Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
Alfred Galichon
发表日期2017-11-22
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classical fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, or risk aversion. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents' preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We then provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. The first algorithm operates under any structure of heterogeneity in preferences; the second is more efficient, but applies only in the case in which random utilities are logit. We show that the log-likelihood of the model has a simple expression and we compute its derivatives. As an empirical illustration, we build a model of marriage with preferences over the partner type and private consumption, which we estimate on a British dataset.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Sorting Matching Marriage market Intrahousehold allocation Imperfectly transferable utility
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12455
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541266
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alfred Galichon. DP12455 Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility. 2017.
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