| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12456 |
| DP12456 Contests with Insurance | |
| Aner Sela; Yizhaq Minchuk | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-22 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information where contestants have non-linear effort functions. Before the contest begins, the designer offers the option of insurance for which a contestant pays a premium for the contest designer who reimburses this contestant's cost of effort if he does not win. We demonstrate that contests with insurance may be profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize his expected revenue as based on the contestants expected total effort, the premium of the insured contestants, and their reimbursement. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contests All-pay auctions Reimbursement Insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12456 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541267 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Yizhaq Minchuk. DP12456 Contests with Insurance. 2017. |
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