| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12474 |
| DP12474 Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment | |
| Matthias Heinz; Pooyan Khashabi; Nick Zubanov; Tobias Kretschmer; Guido Friebel | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and firm-specific factors. Much less is known about the role of factors outside the firm. We investigate the role of market competition on the effectiveness of PfP. Our theory posits that there are two counteracting effects, a business stealing and a competitor response effect, that jointly generate an inverted U-shape relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition creates low incentives to exert effort because there is little extra market to gain, while strong competition creates low incentives as competitors respond more. PfP hence has the strongest effect for moderate competition. We test this prediction with a field experiment on a retail chain which confirms our theory and refutes alternative explanations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Pay for performance (pfp) Management practices Market competition Business stealing Competitor response |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12474 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541285 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthias Heinz,Pooyan Khashabi,Nick Zubanov,et al. DP12474 Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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