| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12475 |
| DP12475 Hierarchical Bank Supervision | |
| Rafael Repullo | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a model in which a central and a local supervisor contribute their efforts to obtain information on the solvency of a local bank, which is then used by the central supervisor to decide on its early liquidation. This hierarchical model is contrasted with the alternatives of decentralized and centralized supervision, where only the local or the central supervisor collects information and decides on liquidation. The local supervisor has a higher bias against liquidation (supervisory capture) and a lower cost of getting local information (proximity). Hierarchical supervision is the optimal institutional design when the bias of the local supervisor is high but not too high and the costs of getting local information from the center are low but not too low. With low (high) bias and high (low) cost it is better to concentrate all responsibilities in the local (central) supervisor. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Centralized vs decentralized supervision Strategic information acquisition Bank solvency Bank liquidation Supervisory capture Optimal institutional design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12475 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541286 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rafael Repullo. DP12475 Hierarchical Bank Supervision. 2017. |
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