G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12483
DP12483 On Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods
Pasquale Schiraldi
发表日期2017-12-04
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We explore existence and properties of equilibrium when N>1 bidders compete for L>1 objects via simultaneous but separate auctions. Bidders have private combinatorial valuations over all sets of objects they could win, and objects are complements in the sense that these valuations are supermodular in the set of objects won. We provide a novel partial order on types under which best replies are monotone, and demonstrate that Bayesian Nash equilibria which are monotone with respect to this partial order exist on any finite bid lattice. We apply this result to show existence of monotone Bayesian Nash equilibria in continuous bid spaces when a single global bidder competes for L objects against many local bidders who bid for single objects only, highlighting the step in this extension which fails with multiple global bidders. We therefore instead consider an alternative equilibrium with endogenous tie-breaking building on Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2002), and demonstrate that this exists in general. Finally, we explore efficiency in simultaneous auctions with symmetric bidders, establishing novel sufficient conditions under which inefficiency in expectation approaches zero as the number of bidders increases.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Simultaneous auctions Complementarities Synergies Equilibria existence Multi-object auctions Monotone strategies Efficiency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12483
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541294
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Pasquale Schiraldi. DP12483 On Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods. 2017.
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