| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12492 |
| DP12492 On the Optimal Majority Rule | |
| Philippe Jehiel; Olivier Compte | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a simple model that rationalizes why less stringent majority rules are preferable to unanimity in large committees. Proposals are randomly generated and the running proposal is adopted whenever it is approved by a sufficiently large share of voters. Unanimity induces excessive delays while too weak majority requirements induce the adoption of suboptimal proposals. The optimal majority rule balances these two inefficiencies: it requires the approval by a share equal to the probability (assumed to be constant across proposals) that a given member gets more than the average welfare associated with the running proposal. Various extensions are considered. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12492 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541303 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Jehiel,Olivier Compte. DP12492 On the Optimal Majority Rule. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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