| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12493 |
| DP12493 Prize allocation and incentives in team contests | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Benoît SY Crutzen; Sabine Flamand | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a contest between teams that compete for multiple indivisible prizes. Team output is a CES function of all the team members' efforts. We use a generalized Tullock contest success function to allocate prizes between teams. We study how different intra-team prize allocation rules impact team output. We consider an egalitarian rule that gives all members the same chance of receiving a prize, and a list rule that sets ex-ante the order in which members receive a prize. The convexity of the cost of effort function and the complementarity of individual efforts determine which rule maximizes team output and success. Our results speak to many real world situations, such as elections, contests for the allocation of local public goods and the internal organization of firms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12493 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541304 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Benoît SY Crutzen,Sabine Flamand. DP12493 Prize allocation and incentives in team contests. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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