| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12498 |
| DP12498 Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure | |
| Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that vertical foreclosure can have a dynamic rationale. By refusing to supply an efficient downstream rival, a vertically integrated incumbent sacrifices current profits but can exclude the rival by depriving it of the critical profits (or sales) it needs to be successful. In turn, monopolising the downstream market may prevent the incumbent from losing its future profits because: (a) it allows the incumbent to extract rents from an efficient upstream rival if future upstream entry cannot be discouraged; or (b) it also deters future upstream entry by weakening competition for the input and reducing the post-entry profits of the prospective upstream competitor. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Inefficient foreclosure Refusal to supply Exclusion Monopolisation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12498 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541309 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chiara Fumagalli,Massimo Motta. DP12498 Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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