| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12503 |
| DP12503 Deadlock on the Board | |
| Jason Donaldson; Giorgia Piacentino; Nadya Malenko | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic model of board decision making. We show that directors may knowingly retain the policy they all think is the worst just because they fear they may disagree about what policy is best in the future—the fear of deadlock begets deadlock. Board diversity can exacerbate deadlock. Hence, shareholders may optimally appoint a biased director to avoid deadlock. On the other hand, the CEO may appoint unbiased directors, or even directors biased against him, to create deadlock and thereby entrench himself. Still, shareholders may optimally give the CEO some power to appoint directors. Our theory thus gives a new explanation for CEO entrenchment. It also gives a new perspective on director tenure, staggered boards, and short-termism. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate boards Deadlock Entrenchment Ceo turnover Director elections |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12503 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541314 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jason Donaldson,Giorgia Piacentino,Nadya Malenko. DP12503 Deadlock on the Board. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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