| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12540 |
| DP12540 Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations | |
| Susanne Goldlücke | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games with monetary transfers. Starting from the observation that the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models, we develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. New negotiations take place with positive probability each period and treat previous informal agreements as bygones. The concept nests relational contracting and hold-up models as opposite corner cases. Allowing for intermediate cases sheds light on many plausible trade-offs that do not arise in these corner cases. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Relational contracting Hold-up Negotiations Stochastic games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12540 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541351 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Susanne Goldlücke. DP12540 Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations. 2017. |
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