| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12547 |
| DP12547 Buyer Group and Buyer Power When Sellers Compete | |
| Doh-Shin Jeon | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how buyer group affects buyer power when sellers compete with non-linear tariffs and buyers operate in separate markets. In the baseline model of two symmetric sellers and two symmetric buyers, we characterize the set of equilibria under buyer group, the set without buyer group and compare both. We find that the interval of each buyer's equilibrium payoffs without buyer group is a strict subset of the interval under buyer group if each seller's cost function is strictly convex, whereas the two intervals are identical if the cost function is concave. Our result implies that buyer group has no effect when the cost function is concave. When it is strictly convex, buyer group strictly reduces the buyers' payoff as long as, under buyer group, we select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in terms of the sellers' payoffs. We extend this result to asymmetric settings with an arbitrary number of buyers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Buyer group Buyer power Competition in non-linear tariffs Discriminatory offers Common agency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12547 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541358 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doh-Shin Jeon. DP12547 Buyer Group and Buyer Power When Sellers Compete. 2017. |
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