| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12550 |
| DP12550 Childcare and Commitment within Households | |
| Paula Gobbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a semi-cooperative marital decision process to explain parental underinvestment in childcare. First, parents collectively choose the amount of labor to supply and, in a second step, they each choose the amount of childcare as the outcome of a Cournot game. Non-cooperative behavior stems from the lack of a credible commitment between spouses regarding the amount of childcare they each supply. The theoretical model is able to reproduce that parental time with children increases both with an individual's education and with that of his/her partner. The limited commitment problem leads to an underinvestment in childcare and, hence, child quality: compared to the efficient provision of childcare, the semi-cooperative framework leads to an amount of child quality that is 45% lower. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Time use Childcare Education Semi-cooperative model Structural estimation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12550 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541361 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paula Gobbi. DP12550 Childcare and Commitment within Households. 2017. |
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