| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12557 |
| DP12557 The Simple Economics of White Elephants | |
| Gerard Llobet | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-03 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uniformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract, which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Concession contracts Information acquisition Flexible-term concessions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12557 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541368 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Llobet. DP12557 The Simple Economics of White Elephants. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Gerard Llobet]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Gerard Llobet]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Gerard Llobet]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
