| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12569 |
| DP12569 Experimenting with Career Concerns | |
| Marina Halac; Ilan Kremer | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that they learn about project quality from bad news, i.e. a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Strategic experimentation Dynamic games Private learning Banks Bad loans Career concerns |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12569 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541380 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Halac,Ilan Kremer. DP12569 Experimenting with Career Concerns. 2018. |
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