| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12570 |
| DP12570 Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy | |
| Marina Halac; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare coordinated rules -- chosen jointly by a group of countries -- to uncoordinated rules. If governments' present bias is small, coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, coordinated rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits enhance welfare, and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Institutions Asymmetric and private information Macroeconomic policy Structure of government Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12570 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541381 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. DP12570 Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy. 2018. |
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