| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12572 |
| DP12572 Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification | |
| Marina Halac; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased towards higher actions. She can verify the agent's information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the verification cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent is allowed to choose any action below a threshold or request verification and the efficient action if sufficiently constrained. For higher costs, however, the principal may require verification only for intermediate actions, dividing the delegation set. TEC is always optimal if the principal cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the verification decision and result. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Optimal delegation Costly verification Escape clause |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12572 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541383 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. DP12572 Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification. 2018. |
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