| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12575 |
| DP12575 Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability | |
| Rohini Pande; Jessica Leight; Dana Foarta | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-06 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Community targeting of vote payments — defined as the saturation of entire neighborhoods with cash prior to elections — is widespread in the developing world. In this paper, we utilize laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya to demonstrate that, relative to individual targeting, a vote-buying regime that distributes payments widely renders voters more tolerant of politician rent-seeking, and increases the level of politician rent-seeking observed in equilibrium. The most parsimonious model of preferences consistent with these patterns is a model in which both politicians and voters are characterized by multifaceted social preferences, encompassing reciprocity, altruism, and inequality aversion. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12575 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541386 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rohini Pande,Jessica Leight,Dana Foarta. DP12575 Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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