| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12588 |
| DP12588 Optimal Short-Termism | |
| Dirk Hackbarth; Alejandro Rivera; Tak-Yuen Wong | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, while shareholders choose initially optimal leverage and ex-post optimal default policies. There are three results. First, shareholders trade off the benefits of short-termism (current cash flows) against the benefits of higher growth from long-term effort (future cash flows), but because shareholders only split the latter with bondholders, they find short-termism ex-post optimal. Second, bright (grim) growth prospects imply lower (higher) optimal levels of short-termism. Third, the endogenous default threshold rises with the substitutability of tasks and, for a positive correlation of shocks, the endogenous default threshold is hump-shaped in the volatility of permanent shocks, but increases monotonically with the volatility of transitory shocks. Finally, we quantify agency costs of short-term and long-term effort, cost of short-termism, effects of investor time horizons, credit spreads, and risk-shifting. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital structure Contracting Multi-tasking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12588 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541399 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Hackbarth,Alejandro Rivera,Tak-Yuen Wong. DP12588 Optimal Short-Termism. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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