| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12591 |
| DP12591 Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market | |
| Manuel Adelino; Kristopher S. Gerardi | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-14 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central result in the theory of adverse selection in asset markets is that informed sellers can signal quality and obtain higher prices by delaying trade. This paper provides some of the first evidence of a signaling mechanism through trade delays using the residential mortgage market as a laboratory. We find a strong relationship between mortgage performance and time to sale for privately securitized mortgages. Additionally, deals made up of more seasoned mortgages are sold at lower yields. These effects are strongest in the "Alt-A" segment of the market, where mortgages are often sold with incomplete hard information, and in cases where the originator and the issuer of mortgage-backed securities are not affliated. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12591 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541402 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Adelino,Kristopher S. Gerardi. DP12591 Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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