G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12598
DP12598 Common Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct
Martin Schmalz
发表日期2018-01-15
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting firms affect firm behavior has been the subject of theoretical inquiry for decades. Since then, consolidation and increasing concentration in the asset-management industry has led to more pronounced common ownership concentration (CoOCo). Moreover, recent empirical research has provided evidence consistent with the literature's key predictions. The resulting antitrust concerns have received much attention from policy makers worldwide. However, the implications are more general: CoOCo affects the objective function of the firm, and therefore has implications for all subfields of economics studying corporate conduct -- including corporate governance, strategy, industrial organization, and all of financial economics. This article connects the papers establishing the theoretical foundations, reviews the empirical and legal literatures, and discusses challenges and opportunities for future research.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization
关键词Ownership Control Network Industry concentration Antitrust Objective of the firm Shareholder unanimity
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12598
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541409
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Martin Schmalz. DP12598 Common Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct. 2018.
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