Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12598 |
DP12598 Common Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct | |
Martin Schmalz | |
发表日期 | 2018-01-15 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting firms affect firm behavior has been the subject of theoretical inquiry for decades. Since then, consolidation and increasing concentration in the asset-management industry has led to more pronounced common ownership concentration (CoOCo). Moreover, recent empirical research has provided evidence consistent with the literature's key predictions. The resulting antitrust concerns have received much attention from policy makers worldwide. However, the implications are more general: CoOCo affects the objective function of the firm, and therefore has implications for all subfields of economics studying corporate conduct -- including corporate governance, strategy, industrial organization, and all of financial economics. This article connects the papers establishing the theoretical foundations, reviews the empirical and legal literatures, and discusses challenges and opportunities for future research. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Ownership Control Network Industry concentration Antitrust Objective of the firm Shareholder unanimity |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12598 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541409 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Schmalz. DP12598 Common Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Martin Schmalz]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Martin Schmalz]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Martin Schmalz]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。