| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12612 |
| DP12612 Bait and Ditch: Consumer Naiveté and Salesforce Incentives | |
| Fabian Herweg | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naive. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add-on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add-on, yet naive ones can be talked into buying it. By offering its store manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add-on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more-than-competitive profits. The equilibrium features market segmentation with the deceptive retailer targeting only naive consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones. Welfare is not monotone in the fraction of naive consumers in the market. Hence, policy interventions designed to de-bias naive consumers might backfire. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Add-on pricing Bait and switch Consumer naiveté Incentive contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12612 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541424 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabian Herweg. DP12612 Bait and Ditch: Consumer Naiveté and Salesforce Incentives. 2018. |
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