| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12633 |
| DP12633 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Leasing Market: Are Buybacks the Solution? | |
| Daniel Bird | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-22 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the problem faced by a car-leasing firm in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard. While the literature has primarily focused on the role of leasing in avoiding adverse selection and the role of an above market buyback price in this environment, we show how this result reverses when moral hazard concerns are severe. The key driver of this result is that a low buy back price can incentivize non-contractible investment. We test the model using a difference-in-differences technique to compare accident outcomes of individuals driving leased company vehicles in Israel before and after a tax change and differentiate between drivers by their probability of utilizing the buyback clause. Our analysis shows that once exiting the leasing cycle becomes a relevant option due to a 110 percent increase in the tax rate on company cars it decreases the at-fault accident rate by half an accident per year (s.e. 0.25) for relevant drivers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Adverse selection Leasing Buyback |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12633 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Bird. DP12633 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Leasing Market: Are Buybacks the Solution?. 2018. |
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