| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12634 |
| DP12634 Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Maria Berlin; Bei Qin | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-22 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Fostering whistleblowing through leniency and asymmetric sanctions is regarded as a potentially powerful anti-corruption strategy in the light of its success in busting cartels. The US Department of Justice started a pilot program of this kind in 2016. It has been argued, however, that introduced in China in 1997, these policies did not help against corruption. We map the evolution of the Chinese anti-corruption legislation and aggregate enforcement data, documenting a large and stable fall in prosecuted cases after the 1997 reform. The fall is consistent with reduced corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with improved deterrence. To resolve the ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption trials. Results point indeed at a negative effect of the 1997 reform on corruption detection and deterrence, but plausibly linked to its poor design: contrary to what theory prescribes, it increased leniency also for bribe-taking bureaucrats that cooperate after being denounced, enhancing their ability to retaliate against whistleblowing bribe-givers. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Leniency Corruption Deterrence China |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12634 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541446 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Maria Berlin,Bei Qin. DP12634 Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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