| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12664 |
| DP12664 Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management | |
| Lasse Heje Pedersen; Nicolae Bogdan Garleanu | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-01-29 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform after fees, and the net performance of the average manager depends on the number of "noise allocators." Small investors should be passive, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asset management investment Information Search Efficiency Asset pricing Liquidity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12664 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541476 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lasse Heje Pedersen,Nicolae Bogdan Garleanu. DP12664 Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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