| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12672
|
| DP12672 Balanced Voting |
| Hans Gersbach
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-01
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We introduce 'Balanced Voting', a voting scheme tailored to fundamental societal decisions. It works as follows: Citizens may abstain from voting on a fundamental direction in a first stage. This guarantees the voting right in a second voting stage on the variants of the fundamental direction chosen in the first. All losers from the first stage also obtain voting rights in the second stage, while winners do not. We develop a model with two fundamental directions and variants of these directions. Information about the preferences is private. We identify circumstances under which Balanced Voting performs well with regard to utilitarian welfare and Pareto dominance. We discuss the robustness of the results, procedural rules to implement the voting scheme, and extensions. Moreover, we provide several examples, such as the US presidential election, for which the scheme could be applied. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Balanced voting
Fundamental decision
Tyranny of majority
Minority protection
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12672
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541484
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Hans Gersbach. DP12672 Balanced Voting. 2018.
|
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