| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12673 |
| DP12673 The Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies | |
| Hans Gersbach; Oriol Tejada | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized, who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. This property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their reform ability. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Democracy Costs of reform Political polarization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12673 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541485 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Oriol Tejada. DP12673 The Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies. 2018. |
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