| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12674 |
| DP12674 Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives | |
| Martin Schmalz; Florian Ederer; Mireia Gine | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When one firm’s strategy affects other firms’ value, optimal executive incentives depend on whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output. Hence, greater managerial effort can lead to lower product prices and industry profits. Therefore, steep managerial incentives can be optimal for a single firm and at the same time violate the interests of common owners of several firms in the same industry. Empirically, managerial wealth is more sensitive to performance when a firm’s largest shareholders do not own large stakes in competitors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Common ownership Competition Ceo pay Management incentives Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12674 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541486 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Schmalz,Florian Ederer,Mireia Gine. DP12674 Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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