| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12690 |
| DP12690 Principle or Opportunism? Discretion, Capital, and Incentives | |
| Michel Habib; Josef Falkinger | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-06 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When should shareholders afford a manager the discretion to be opportunistic and when should they constrain him to be principled? We show that discretion is associated with lower powered incentives than is constraint: opportunism may put shareholder capital at risk; shareholder can lessen that risk by lowering the power of managerial incentives, thereby decreasing the manager's incentives to spurn principle for opportunity. We further show that the cost of capital plays a central role in favoring discretion over constraint: the use of capital constitutes an externality; when the cost of capital is low, the externality is of relatively little importance, and the manager is afforded the discretion to be opportunistic. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12690 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541502 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michel Habib,Josef Falkinger. DP12690 Principle or Opportunism? Discretion, Capital, and Incentives. 2018. |
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