| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12697 |
| DP12697 The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunneling | |
| YIshay Yafeh; Jesse Fried; Ehud Kamar | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing rent extraction by controllers. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are often insufficient, some jurisdictions give minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions. To assess these rights’ effectiveness, we exploit a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions, including the pay of controllers and their relatives (“controller executives”). We find that the reform curbed controller-executive pay and led some controller executives to resign or go with little or no pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would be rejected. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Controlling shareholders Tunneling Corporate governance Minority shareholders Shareholder voting Veto rights Securities regulation Corporate law Executive compensation Related party transactions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12697-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541509 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | YIshay Yafeh,Jesse Fried,Ehud Kamar. DP12697 The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunneling. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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