| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12699 |
| DP12699 Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect | |
| Dino Gerardi | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet effect is in place since the firm has the incentive to change the terms of trade and offer more demanding contracts when it learns that the worker is highly productive. As the parties become arbitrarily patient, the equilibrium outcome takes one of two forms. If the prior probability of the worker being productive is low, the firm offers a pooling contract and no information is ever revealed. In contrast, if this prior probability is high, the firm fires the unproductive worker at the very beginning of the relationship. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic contracting Limited commitment Ratchet effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12699 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541511 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dino Gerardi. DP12699 Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect. 2018. |
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