| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12706 |
| DP12706 Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication | |
| Dezso Szalay; Inga Deimen | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A decision-maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision-maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about each. The decision-maker can either get advice from the expert or delegate decision-making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns his privately optimal action and chooses it. Under communication, advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses from strategic communication. We characterize the communication problems that make the expert acquire information of equal use to expert and decision-maker. In these problems, communication outperforms delegation. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Endogenous information Delegated expertise Strategic information transmission Delegation Effectiveness of biased communication |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12706 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541518 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dezso Szalay,Inga Deimen. DP12706 Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication. 2018. |
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