| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12720 |
| DP12720 Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck | |
| Erwan Morellec | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-13 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both short- and long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both over- and underinvestment in short- and long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. Exposure to long-run shocks introduces pay-for-luck in incentive compensation but only after sufficiently good performance due to incentive compatibility, thereby rationalizing the asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data. Correlated short- and long-run shocks to earnings and firm size lead to externalities in incentive provision over different time horizons. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12720 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541531 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Erwan Morellec. DP12720 Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck. 2018. |
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