全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP12724 Waiting for the payday? The market for startups and the timing of entrepreneurial exit

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP12724
	DP12724 Waiting for the payday? The market for startups and the timing of entrepreneurial exit
	Thomas Rønde; Ashish Arora; Andrea Fosfuri
发表日期	2018-02-15
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Most technology startups are set up for exit through acquisition by large corporations. In choosing when to sell, startups face a tradeoff. Early acquisitions reduce execution errors but later acquisitions improve the likelihood of finding a better match because there are fewer buyers in the early market as early acquisitions require costly absorptive capacity. Moreover, the decision of buyers to invest in absorptive capacity is related to the decision of startups on the timing of the exit sale. In this paper, we build a model to capture this complexity and the related tradeoffs. We find that the early market for startups is inefficiently thin when the timing of exit is a strategic choice, i.e. startups have to commit whether to go early or late. Too few startups are sold early and too few buyers invest in absorptive capacity. Venture capital paradoxically aggravates the inefficiency. Instead, when the timing of exit is a tactical choice, i.e., startups can choose to go late after observing the early offers, there are too many early acquisitions and too much investment in absorptive capacity by incumbents.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Entrepreneurial exit Markets for technology Absorptive capacity
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp12724
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541535
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Thomas Rønde,Ashish Arora,Andrea Fosfuri. DP12724 Waiting for the payday? The market for startups and the timing of entrepreneurial exit. 2018.