| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12732
|
| DP12732 Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition? |
| Dirk Hackbarth
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-18
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study anti-competitive mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge, which trades off benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. There are three results. First, mergers are optimal when collusion fails (i.e., firms sufficiently deviate from a collusive regime). Second, long periods of collusion are likely, because colluding is dynamically stable. Therefore, mergers are rare. Third, mergers (and, in particular, lower merger costs) decrease pre-merger collusion, as punishments by price wars are weakened. Thus, although anti-competitive mergers harm competition ex-post, barriers and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition ex-ante. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Competition
Imperfect information
Industry structure
market power
Horizontal mergers
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12732
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541542
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dirk Hackbarth. DP12732 Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?. 2018.
|
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