| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12751 |
| DP12751 Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals | |
| Michael Kremer; Christopher Snyder | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Kremer and Snyder (2015) show that demand curves for a preventive and treatment may have different shapes though they target the same disease, biasing the pharmaceutical manufacturer toward developing the lucrative rather than the socially desirable product. This paper tightens the theoretical bounds on the potential deadweight loss from such biases. Using a calibration of the global demand for HIV pharmaceuticals, we demonstrate the dramatically sharper analysis achievable with the new bounds, allowing us to pinpoint potential deadweight loss at 62% of the global gain from curing HIV.We use the calibration to perform policy counterfactuals, assessing welfare effects of government policies such as a subsidy, reference pricing, and price-discrimination ban. The fit of our calibration is good: we find that a hypothetical drug monopolist would price an HIV drug so high that only 4% of the infected population worldwide would purchase, matching actual drug prices and quantities in the early 2000s before subsidies in low-income countries ramped up. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Pharmaceuticals Deadweight loss Product development |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12751 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541561 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Kremer,Christopher Snyder. DP12751 Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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