| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12777 |
| DP12777 Sovereign Defaults in Court | |
| Christoph Trebesch; Julian Schumacher; Henrik Enderlein | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-07 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For centuries, defaulting governments were immune from legal action by foreign creditors. This paper shows that this is no longer the case. Building a dataset covering four decades, we find that creditor lawsuits have become an increasingly common feature of sovereign debt markets. The legal developments have strengthened the hands of creditors and raised the cost of default for debtors. We show that legal disputes in the US and the UK disrupt government access to international capital markets, as foreign courts can impose a financial embargo on sovereigns. The findings are consistent with theoretical models with creditor sanctions and suggest that sovereign debt is becoming more enforceable. We discuss how the threat of litigation affects debt management, government willingness to pay, and the resolution of debt crises. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Sovereign default Enforcement Government financing Debt restructuring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12777 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541586 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christoph Trebesch,Julian Schumacher,Henrik Enderlein. DP12777 Sovereign Defaults in Court. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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