G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12781
DP12781 Tax Evasion and Inequality
Gabriel Zucman; Niels Johannesen; Annette Alstadsæter
发表日期2018-03-07
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper estimates the size and distribution of tax evasion. We combine random audits, tax amnesties, and leaks from offshore financial institutions matched to wealth records in Scandinavia. Tax evasion rises sharply with wealth: 3% of personal taxes are evaded on average, versus 25%–30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution. A model of the supply of evasion services can explain this gradient. Taking tax evasion into account increases inequality substantially. After using tax amnesties, evaders do not seem to increase legal tax avoidance, suggesting that fighting evasion can allow governments to collect more taxes from the wealthy.
主题Public Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12781
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541590
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gabriel Zucman,Niels Johannesen,Annette Alstadsæter. DP12781 Tax Evasion and Inequality. 2018.
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