G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12789
DP12789 A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions
Micael Castanheira; Laurent Bouton; Allan Drazen
发表日期2018-03-12
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要We present a model of electorally-motivated, small campaign contributions. The analysis uncovers interesting interactions among small donors and has novel implications for the effect of income inequality on total contributions and election outcomes. Moreover, it helps explain a number of empirical observations that seem anomalous when contributions are driven by the consumption or the influence motives. We also study the impact of different forms of campaign finance laws on contribution behavior, probabilities of electoral outcomes, and welfare. Our results are consistent with more behaviorally motivated donors when contributions are driven by the parties' strategic solicitation of funds. We also indicate how the model and its results may have important implications for empirical work on campaign contributions.
主题Public Economics
关键词Campaign contributions Campaign finance laws Electoral motive Income inequality
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12789
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541598
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Micael Castanheira,Laurent Bouton,Allan Drazen. DP12789 A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. 2018.
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