Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12789 |
DP12789 A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions | |
Micael Castanheira; Laurent Bouton; Allan Drazen | |
发表日期 | 2018-03-12 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We present a model of electorally-motivated, small campaign contributions. The analysis uncovers interesting interactions among small donors and has novel implications for the effect of income inequality on total contributions and election outcomes. Moreover, it helps explain a number of empirical observations that seem anomalous when contributions are driven by the consumption or the influence motives. We also study the impact of different forms of campaign finance laws on contribution behavior, probabilities of electoral outcomes, and welfare. Our results are consistent with more behaviorally motivated donors when contributions are driven by the parties' strategic solicitation of funds. We also indicate how the model and its results may have important implications for empirical work on campaign contributions. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Campaign contributions Campaign finance laws Electoral motive Income inequality |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12789 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541598 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Micael Castanheira,Laurent Bouton,Allan Drazen. DP12789 A Theory of Small Campaign Contributions. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。