| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12791 |
| DP12791 Regulatory Competition in Banking: A General Equilibrium Approach | |
| Hans Gersbach; Hans Haller | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study competition between governments with regard to capital requirements, bank levies and resolution regimes in a general equilibrium setting. In a two-country model, households can invest both domestically and abroad, with banks acting as intermediaries between households and risky technologies. When competing governments set banking regulation, the mechanism at work is driven by the trade-off between accentuating benefits over costs stemming from banking activities, on the one hand, and enhancing banks' competitiveness, on the other hand. Whether or not regulatory competition yields the efficient allocation of resources and risks crucially depends on whether governments compete with one, two or three policy tools. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Regulatory competition General equilibrium Capital requirements Bank levy Bank resolution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12791 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541600 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Hans Haller. DP12791 Regulatory Competition in Banking: A General Equilibrium Approach. 2018. |
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