| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12797
|
| DP12797 Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules |
| T. Renee Bowen; Vincent Anesi
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-20
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which, each period, committee members choose to implement a risky reform or implement a policy with known returns. We first show that when no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When committee members are allowed to redistribute resources (even arbitrarily small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any non-collegial voting rule. With collegial voting rules, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights, not constraints on redistribution, constitute the main obstacle to optimal policy experimentation. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Voting rules
Redistribution
Committees
Experimentation
Reforms
Endogenous status quo
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12797
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541606
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
T. Renee Bowen,Vincent Anesi. DP12797 Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules. 2018.
|
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