| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12805 |
| DP12805 News and Archival Information in Games | |
| Ran Spiegler | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I enrich the typology of players in the standard model of games with incomplete information, by allowing them to have incomplete "archival information" - namely, piecemeal knowledge of correlations among relevant variables. A player is characterized by the conventional Harsanyi type (a.k.a "news-information") as well as the novel "archive-information", formalized as a collection of subsets of variables. The player can only learn the marginal distributions over these subsets of variables. The player extrapolates a well-specified probabilistic belief according to the maximum-entropy criterion. This formalism expands our ability to capture strategic situations with "boundedly rational expectations." I demonstrate the expressive power and use of this formalism with some examples. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Non-rational expectations Archival information Maximum entropy Causal models High-order beliefs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12805 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541614 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ran Spiegler. DP12805 News and Archival Information in Games. 2018. |
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