| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12851 |
| DP12851 Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management | |
| Andrew Ellul; Marco Pagano; Annalisa Scognamiglio | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion entailing a yearly average compensation loss of $664,000. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal performance or involve mid-level employees. Based on a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, we find that these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Careers Hedge funds Asset managers Market discipline Scarring effects |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12851 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541661 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Ellul,Marco Pagano,Annalisa Scognamiglio. DP12851 Career Risk and Market Discipline in Asset Management. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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